Venezuela: UN mechanisms must continue their work for justice

Whilst Maduro’s forced removal in January 2026 generated cautious hope and created a critical opportunity for significant long-term change, at the time of writing the vast majority of the individuals, institutions and high-level state structures responsible for facilitating crimes against humanity remain intact.

There has been no purge of the repressive bodies based on accountability for human rights violations.

The most significant changes occurred with the resignations of the Attorney General and the Ombudsman who were assigned to other public posts and replaced by people who had served previously under the regime.  Another change involved the Minister of Defence who was replaced by the former head of  SEBIN , under whose command this security agency carried out arbitrary arrests and acts of torture, as reported by the FFM.

The judiciary continues to be made up of judges and prosecutors who, for years, have arbitrarily imprisoned thousands of Venezuelans persecuted for political reasons. That same judiciary is responsible for implementing the Amnesty Law, arbitrarily denying its application in at least 400 cases.

The Amnesty Act was designed to exclude significant periods from 1999 onwards and to exclude groups of political prisoners who were imprisoned or prosecuted for events that took place during those periods. This law has been applied without transparency. Jorge Izarra, chair of the Special Commission for Monitoring the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence in Venezuela, reported that more than 8,600 people benefited from the law, but no verifiable or auditable lists have been provided. A petition submitted by the NGO Espacio Público requesting access to these lists was denied by Prosecutor Devoe.

The legal framework on which the persecution of political opponents – or those perceived as such – has been based also remains in force. Thus, on 3 January 2026, a Decree on the State of External Emergency was issued, adding to the regulations that allow for the criminalisation of people perceived as opponents, including human rights defenders. The Constitutional Law Against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance, the Simón Bolívar Law, Resolution No. 2012-0026 of 17 October 2012 of the Supreme Court of Justice—which establishes courts with jurisdiction over terrorism— and Resolution No. 2015-0007 of 15 March 2025, which partially amends it.

The threat of bans and persecution against NGOs and other social organisations remains. The Law on the Supervision, Regulation, Operation and Funding of Non-Governmental Organisations and Non-Profit Social Organisations (the ‘Anti-NGO Law’), which came into force on 15 November 2024, remains in force.

The persistent uncertainty surrounding the internal power dynamics within Venezuela’s ruling elite could further increase the risk of renewed repression and ongoing human rights violations, exacerbating the vulnerability of millions of people who are already living under extreme socio-economic pressure.

Any meaningful reform process must therefore be comprehensive, and include the dismantling of the security forces and intelligence services implicated in crimes against humanity, the reform of the judicial and electoral systems, and the repeal of legislation that has enabled political persecution and the systematic restriction of civic space.

In this context of transition, monitoring mechanisms play a particularly critical role. Mechanisms like the FFM provide the independent oversight needed to assess where real progress is being made, to distinguish between structural reforms and cosmetic measures designed to divert international attention, and to ensure that evolving political dynamics continue to be assessed from a human rights perspective. Ongoing human rights monitoring and public reporting remain essential to preserving international leverage over the authorities and maintaining pressure for meaningful, rights-based change.

Within this framework, the FFM’s investigations since 2019 have made it possible to map the structural risk factors that facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela. The Mission’s continued public reporting is therefore indispensable for determining whether the announced reforms address these underlying factors of abuse or whether they amount to mere superficial adjustments. Its recommendations are also fundamental to closing protection gaps and ensuring that structural reforms are effectively targeted at addressing the identified risks of atrocities at the institutional level. By providing an independent assessment of progress – or the lack thereof – in dismantling the structures that facilitated past atrocities, the FFM plays a crucial role in contributing to efforts to reduce the risk of repetition, strengthen guarantees of non-repetition and ensure that any potential political transition is based on a robust framework for the prevention of atrocities.

Furthermore, periods of political transition are precisely those in which the potential deterrent effect of independent investigations is greatest. As the Venezuelan authorities seek international legitimacy and move towards greater political normalisation and economic openness, there is a critical window of opportunity for external actors to influence their calculations and encourage meaningful change.

Experience in recent years suggests that international scrutiny can alter the behaviour of perpetrators and institutions that are sensitive to reputational costs. Venezuelan human rights organisations documented that, following the publication of the FFM’s first report in September 2020, the number of extrajudicial executions fell by more than 50 per cent between January 2020 and December 2021, whilst the role of the Special Action Forces (FAES), identified by the Mission as central to the patterns of extrajudicial killings, was significantly reduced in security operations. Although the underlying structures and policies that enabled the abuses remained in place, these developments demonstrated the capacity of independent investigations and public reporting to act as a deterrent, particularly amongst senior officials responsible for directing security operations. Preserving the FFM’s mandate during this period of heightened sensitivity to international legitimacy is therefore essential not only for accountability and truth, but also for maintaining the ability to influence the authorities and maximising the prospects for meaningful and lasting reform.

The FFM has a fundamental role in guaranteeing the rights to truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition for victims of human rights violations and international crimes, as well as in highlighting the structural reforms necessary to prevent future abuses. The FFM has documented hundreds of cases, identified patterns of crimes under international law, and established a list of people whose participation should be investigated by independent and credible judicial authorities. 

The FFM was one of the first international mechanisms to assert forcefully that Venezuelan authorities have committed serious human rights violations as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population that could constitute crimes against humanity. It identified mid- and high-ranking authorities, including the head of state, as possibly responsible for human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, politically motivated detentions and torture, as well as abuses against demonstrators and revealed the active role of the Venezuelan judiciary in committing human rights violations and ensuring impunity for these egregious abuses, as well as the various mechanisms of repression employed by the rest of the state officials.

Likewise, the FFM evidenced the existence of a plan to repress the opposition or those perceived as such, as well as human rights violations in the Arco Minero del Orinoco and other areas of the State of Bolivar and the lack of genuine reform of law enforcement institutions following the dissolution of the Special Action Forces (FAES).

In a context of impunity, repression and censorship in Venezuela, and almost no progress in human rights, the existence of an independent mechanism of investigation and accountability such as the FFM has allowed victims to be heard and to contribute to guaranteeing their right to justice, truth and reparation. The FFM’s reports continue to be a valuable contribution to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to criminal proceedings under the principle of universal jurisdiction, as illustrated by Argentina’s extradition request to Spain for retired GNB Colonel Ephrain Verdú in connection with the murder of the young woman Geraldín Moreno, which occurred during the protests in February 2014 in Venezuela.

In 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela to assess alleged human rights violations committed in the country since 2014.

This mechanism is the only independent monitoring body within the United Nations with a mandate to investigate systematic human rights violations and abuses and to ensure that those responsible in Venezuela are held to account.

That same year, the UN Human Rights Council also granted the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) a mandate to report on human rights violations in Venezuela and to provide technical assistance to the Venezuelan authorities to improve the human rights situation on the ground.

This mandate differs from and complements that of the FFM, which focuses on identifying individual responsibilities, ensuring accountability and documenting human rights violations and crimes under international law. For example, OHCHR is not tasked with collecting and preserving evidence for future prosecutions, which underlines the complementary nature of the two mandates.

It is important to understand that the OHCHR’s mandate would not exist without the FFM. By focusing on technical assistance rather than public accountability, OHCHR has been able to gain access to the country and carry out its work.

In addition to OHCHR, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has authorised the investigation into the situation in Venezuela to proceed. However, these investigations are still at a preliminary stage of identifying cases, and it is recognised that, in accordance with the principle of the interests of justice set out in the Rome Statute and the Office of the Prosecutor’s policy, not all direct or indirect perpetrators will be prosecuted.

Therefore, the FFM continues to bear the responsibility of documenting, identifying and exposing the perpetrators and chains of command that must be investigated so that victims may obtain truth, justice and reparation. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor focuses on bringing specific charges against particular individuals, whilst the FFM documents structural issues, given that its mandate covers a broader range of human rights abuses and violations. Furthermore, the FFM could continue to gather evidence to enable other proceedings to be initiated or advanced in national jurisdictions.

Between 2019 and 2026, the total budget allocated under the Human Rights Council resolutions on Venezuela and approved by the UN General Assembly amounts to 16,741,400 US dollars. For 2025 and 2026, the estimates amount to US$3,785,050 and US$9,042,000 respectively. This represents 0.1 per cent and 0.2 per cent of the UN’s overall budget approved for 2025 and 2026 respectively.

Due to the UN’s liquidity crisis, these funds have not been fully implemented. This has led to serious budgetary shortfalls and, in turn, staff cuts within the mission.

The approved composition of the mission includes between 13 and 16 staff members with varying levels of commitment. (By way of comparison, around 900 people work at the Venezuelan Ombudsman’s Office, whilst commissions similar to the FFM in other countries, such as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, once had a staff of almost 200.)

In reality, the Mission has not had this number of staff. In April 2026, a researcher from the Mission’s team told Aula Abierta that the Mission currently has only eight members, four of whom are full-time and four on a part-time basis. This equates to six full-time posts, representing on average 35 to 40 per cent of the capacity required to carry out its functions.

Between 2024 and 2026, former experts from the Mission publicly highlighted the challenges this has posed to the performance of their duties.

On 20 January 2026, sixteen national and international civil society organisations have put forward a ten-point list of priority demands. You can find them here. 

The purpose of these ten demands is to identify a series of urgent measures that, in the short term, can steer the current situation towards a genuine and credible democratic transition. 

This list should serve as a starting point, adapted to the country’s current conditions, with the objective of rebuilding trust, restoring legal certainty, and opening effective pathways towards re-establishing the rule of law and democracy. It does not claim to be an exhaustive human rights agenda, nor a comprehensive roadmap for redemocratisation.

Rather, it should be understood as part of a broader process that requires political will, coordination among national and international actors, and the support of legitimate multilateral frameworks, accompanied by international human rights mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. 

The participation of civil society, together with the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, such as the FFM, is essential to achieving an inclusive and sustainable transition, centred on Venezuelan society and on the victims of serious human rights violations.