In a letter to the Chinese government dated 16 April 2026, eight UN human rights experts raised concerns about the new ‘Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress’, adopted by China’s rubber-stamp National People’s Congress on 12 March 2026 and due to enter into force on 1 July. The law significantly restricts the exercise of a range of social and cultural rights in violation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which have been ratified and are binding upon China.
The experts warned that, in its national application, the law could ‘transform temporary or experimental regional measures into binding nationwide obligations’ with serious implications for linguistic, cultural and religious rights and autonomy of ethnic groups and peoples, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols.
The law codifies at the national level the Chinese leadership’s new assimilationist approach to ‘ethnic integration’, so far only tested through provincial and local regulations in predominantly Tibetan and Mongolian areas.
The letter comes as the European Parliament prepares to debate and vote on a resolution on the law and on ‘the intensified suppression of ethnic identities’.
The debate is scheduled for 29 April 2026, with a vote expected on 30 April.
A shift towards a homogeneous national identity
The eight UN experts highlighted that several provisions of the law may contradict China’s Constitution and its 1984 Regional National Autonomy Law (also referred to as the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law)1, including protections relating to the use and development of languages.
The new law codifies a shift in Beijing’s ethnic policy, moving away from the Mao-era approach of nominal ethnic autonomy modelled on the Soviet Union. As legal scholar Carl Minzner notes, this marks a steep departure from the 1984 framework.
While in practice the party-state has long maintained a firm and repressive grip over Tibetan, Uyghur and other autonomous regions – preventing any meaningful form of political autonomy – the 1984 framework still recognised, at least on paper, distinct cultures, languages, religions and ways of life, and provided for nominal autonomous governance and preferential treatment for ethnic groups then officially referred to as ‘nationalities’.
Accelerated under President Xi Jinping, this policy shift moves towards forced assimilation. As Minzner points out, this reflects what scholars call ‘second-generation ethnic policies’, with the legislation explicitly aiming at ‘melting’ diverse identities into a singular, homogeneous Chinese identity. It enshrines practices long described by Uyghur and Tibetan rights groups, UN experts, and scholars as the ‘sinicisation’ of religion and culture. Furthermore, the law’s heavy use of Xi’s ideological slogans, particularly in its preamble, further erodes the boundary between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy and State legislation.
Minzner also warns that the new law risks worsening ethnic tensions across the country. When the government attempted to implement similar measures in Inner Mongolia in 2020, it sparked widespread protests and boycotts, ultimately resulting in the removal of local ethnic Mongolian officials who failed to strictly enforce Beijing’s directives.
The International Campaign for Tibet’s analysis of the new law concludes that its adoption marks the ‘culmination of a decades-long CCP effort to dilute the unique identity of the Tibetan people and codify forced assimilationist policies’. It outlines how the authorities ‘used the Tibetan community to test and fine-tune this [policy] for more than a decade before formalising it at the national level’ and ‘impose a top-down vision of “ethnic unity” which upholds Chinese identity as the norm.’
Restrictions on language, culture and religion
In their letter to China, the eight UN experts observed that the law would ‘restrict minority language education’ by requiring schools and other educational institutions to use Mandarin Chinese as the basic language for teaching. They also noted the risk that provisions could be applied to penalise parents for ‘solely educating their children about their own minority culture, language, or religion’.
While the previous legal framework allowed for bilingual education, the UN’s treaty committees on women’s rights and on economic, social and cultural rights had already urged China in 2023 to ‘abolish immediately the coerced residential (boarding) school system imposed on Tibetan children and allow private Tibetan schools to be established.’
They further called on China to ‘ensure that Mandarin is not the only language of instruction, secure ‘access to instruction in mother tongues’ for Kazakhs, Tibetans and Uyghurs, and ‘reverse the closure of schools providing instruction in minority languages’.
The eight UN experts further raised concerns that requirements for religious groups to follow the ‘direction of Sinicisation’ could interfere with religious doctrine, the independence of religious institutions, and the ability of individuals and communities to manifest their beliefs.
They warned that provisions appear to ‘centralise interpretive authority over what constitutes acceptable cultural expression’, and that measures promoting ‘change of conventions’ and ‘new trends’ could be used to suppress or alter practices, traditions and customs central to the identity of ethnic groups.
Risks of transnational repression and heightened social control
The UN experts also warn that article 63, which allows authorities to prosecute individuals and organisations outside China for acts deemed to ‘undermine national/ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division’ could create risks of transnational repression.
They note that the law does not clearly define what constitutes ‘undermining ethnic unity and progress’, giving authorities wide discretion to interpret and enforce its provisions. This raises concerns about arbitrary enforcement and a chilling effect on the exercise of rights.
Under China’s sweeping national security legislation, cultural rights defenders such as Tibetan activist Tashi Wangchuk and Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti have been jailed on charges of ‘ethnic separatism.’
Worryingly, the law’s article 20 imposes a legal obligation on parents to ‘educate and guide minors to love the CCP, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation’, while requiring them to refrain from instilling ideas deemed detrimental to national unity. Coupled with a new right for citizens to ‘report acts that undermine ethnic unity and progress’ under article 54, the law builds a model of ideological enforcement that entrenches strict social control within families and society.
Uyghur and Tibetan organisations warn of deepening repression
Uyghur, Tibetan and Mongolian groups warn that the law formalises policies already experienced on the ground.
ISHR calls on States to take urgent steps to press China to suspend implementation of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, and to either repeal the law or amend it to ensure full compliance with international human rights standards.
States should further urge China to implement, as matter of priority, recommendations by the CERD, CEDAW and CESCR committees with regards to the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols and other peoples.
ISHR also calls on the High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue monitoring the law’s implementation, including its impact on Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols and other peoples, and to publicly report on any measures that may restrict fundamental rights or enable transnational repression.
