© UN Photo/Elma Okic
Never have we needed a robust international human rights system so badly. But the UN human rights system is in crisis and must be reformed. We need institutions that are principled, consistent, and accountable. Follow our campaign to find out how!
As the United Nations marks its 80th anniversary, the world stands at a crossroads. From escalating conflicts and rising authoritarianism to climate breakdown and deepening inequality, today’s crises are not just political or economic—they are profoundly human. At this pivotal moment, the UN must recommit to its founding promise: to uphold the dignity and rights of all. A reformed and revitalised human rights pillar that is principled, consistent and accountable is not a luxury—it is a necessity.
On 12 March 2025, the Secretary-General Antonio Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative that aims to update the UN’s structures, priorities, and operations for the 21st century so the system ‘remains effective, cost-efficient and responsive to the people it serves’.
Meanwhile, the UN is in crisis:
The UN80 Initiative has been presented as an opportunity to strengthen the UN system and better deliver for all stakeholders, particularly those most marginalised and vulnerable. In practice it has, however, focused on efficiency, rationalisation and trimming spending. In addition, there are concerns that the process has:
UN80 must be a turning point that strengthens the UN’s capacity to respond effectively to injustice, elevate the voices of the marginalised, and ensure that human rights are not sidelined, but centered, in global governance. This is the time for bold leadership, courageous reform, and unwavering commitment to the peoples the UN was created to serve.
We recognise the urgent need for substantive, long-term reform of the UN system in order for it to adequately respond to a world facing multiple acute crises. Decisions should improve the effectiveness, reach, and responsiveness of UN human rights mechanisms, and should not focus solely on efficiency and cost-cutting. As real as the financial crisis facing us all might be, UN80 deliberations must ensure that decisions for reform are in line with the expectations, needs and demands of human rights defenders, victims and survivors.
On 21 July 2025, ISHR and 16 civil society partners sent to the UN Secretary General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights a joint letter regarding the UN80 Initiative with a set of principles, criteria and concrete proposals that should guide the reform process.
Increased political and financial investment in human rights is essential to peace, security and sustainable development at the national, regional and international levels. The UN’s human rights pillar is already chronically underfunded; any cuts to it would result in minimal savings but have significant and disproportionate adverse consequences for the rights of people around the world.
Decisions should improve the effectiveness, relevance, responsiveness and impact of UN human rights mechanisms, and should not focus solely on efficiency and cost-cutting.
Both processes and outcomes should enable, value and reflect the expertise and lived experiences of affected populations.
Reforms must protect key human rights bodies and mechanisms from political interference or budgetary manipulation.
Reforms must be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, core human rights treaties, customary international law and progressively evolving human rights standards.
Reforms must ensure that all situations and issues are addressed on the basis of evidence and by applying human rights norms in a principled and consistent manner and without discrimination, avoiding politicisation, double standards, or selective scrutiny.
Reforms should incentivise meaningful state engagement with UN mechanisms while establishing clear consequences—diplomatic, reputational, or procedural—for obstruction or refusal to cooperate.
There must be pathways to justice for victims and consequences for violators.
Reforms must strengthen mechanisms to hold political, military, and corporate actors accountable for serious human rights violations, regardless of status or power, including through support for international investigative and judicial processes.
Increased political and financial investment in human rights is essential to peace, security and sustainable development at the national, regional and international levels.
♦ Member States should increase their investment in human rights and, in particular, the UN human rights pillar, including as an aspect of their legal obligations under Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
♦ The UN’s human rights pillar is already chronically underfunded, accounting for approximately 5% of the UN regular budget and less than 1% of UN’s total expenditure (regular budget and voluntary contributions). While there may be opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the use of existing resources, the budget for the UN human rights pillar should therefore be safeguarded from any overall UN budget and spending cuts. Any cuts to the human rights pillar would result in minimal savings but have significant and disproportionate adverse consequences for the rights of people around the world, particularly communities and groups subject to various and intersecting forms of discrimination. Conversely, any increase in funding to the human rights pillar could contribute to efficiency by increasing economies of scale; adequate funding for the human rights pillar is highly cost effective in the longer term. Promoting human rights safeguards international peace and security and has a vital preventive function, alleviating or averting severe humanitarian crises.
♦ States must be held accountable for failing to pay UN dues in full and on time, both now and in future years. States that repeatedly fail to pay their UN dues should have their right to vote in any UN body or process – including the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council – suspended until such time as arrears and dues are paid. The provision for default of UN dues set out in article 19 of the UN Charter should be supplemented as needed by additional measures through the UNGA to incentive states to remain in good standing.
OHCHR has a critical role to play in coordinating the promotion and protection of human rights across the UN system, thereby contributing to effectiveness and efficiency. Any reduced funding for OHCHR is likely to reduce coordination, complementarity and efficiency across the UN system.
♦ OHCHR should be provided with the resources necessary to fully discharge its independent mandate, conferred by General Assembly resolution 48/141. In addition to coordination, OHCHR’s mandate includes prevention and accountability for human rights violations. Prevention avoids the significant human and financial costs associated with human rights violations, while accountability is necessary to provide justice to victims and deter future violations and their attendant costs.
♦ In order to contribute to effective and efficient prevention, the High Commissioner should provide regular intersessional briefings to the Human Rights Council on situations that merit the HRC’s attention. Consistently with the HRC’s resolution on the prevention of human rights violations, OHCHR should also ensure a UN system-wide response to early warning signals from national and global civil society, national human rights institutions and UN country offices.
♦ Consistently with its mandate to support and strengthen the effectiveness of the UN human rights machinery, OHCHR should promote and protect the independence, diversity and responsiveness of the Special Procedures, as well as the independence of the investigative mechanisms established by the Human Rights Council. Any standardisation of methods of work, including through changes in personnel and staffing, must be guided by stakeholder inputs.
♦ While OHCHR should explore opportunities to expand field offices and regional presences, and support the mainstreaming of human rights cross-country offices, OHCHR should maintain its primary offices and functions in Geneva. This will leverage economies of scale, contribute to coordination and collaboration with other agencies, assist to guard against fragmentation and duplication, and assist to ensure safe, efficient and effective access for independent civil society. Any location considered by OHCHR for any presence or mechanism should be subject to a civil society impact assessment, identifying any challenges or barriers to safe and effective civil society access and participation.
♦ OHCHR should identify opportunities to streamline and negotiate more favourable commercial terms for expenditures on travel, accommodation and events.
The Human Rights Council is the UN’s peak multilateral human rights body, with a mandate to promote and protect human rights, and prevent and ensure accountability for violations. Its independent mechanisms – including Special Procedures and investigative bodies such as commissions of inquiry – provide access to substantial human rights capacity and expertise, all provided on a voluntary basis.
♦ The General Assembly’s review of the status of the HRC should aim to strengthen the HRC’s mandate, effectiveness and efficiency, as well as elevate the status of human rights across the UN system.
♦ Among other steps, pursuant to article 96(2) of the UN Charter, the General Assembly should authorise the HRC to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising with respect to human rights. This would assist to ensure the principled and consistent development, interpretation and application of international human rights law. It would also contribute to efficiency by increasing the comity of law and providing authoritative guidance on legal matters which may otherwise be subject to different approaches by different mandates and mechanisms.
♦ The HRC’s Special Procedures are independent experts who provide extensive guidance and advice on human rights issues on a fully pro bono basis. In order to maximise efficiencies and fully leverage this pro bono capacity and expertise, it is imperative that the independence of the Special Procedures is respected and protected and that they are provided with the resources necessary to fully discharge their mandates. It is similarly essential to preserve the independence of investigative mechanisms, free from political considerations and interference that may impede their efficiency and effectiveness.
♦ Selectivity and double standards significantly erode the integrity of international human rights law and the effectiveness and efficiency of mechanisms mandated to promote and protect human rights. In order to address this, the HRC should mandate an independent, cross-regional working group of experts empowered to refer urgent situations to the HRC, including by applying the objective criteria set out in the “Irish Principles”. This would ensure that the HRC could be seized of matters on their merits and focus its limited resources on critical situations.
♦ While the duplication of mandates should be avoided, the complementarity of mandates should be encouraged where such mandates can fulfil distinctive functions in relation to a particular theme or situation. Thus, for example, a particular situation may warrant both a commission of inquiry to collect and preserve evidence of atrocity crimes while a Special Procedure is also mandated to engage in dialogue and cooperation with a government or authority. Any merger or consolidation of mandates should only be undertaken following an assessment as to the implications for operational independence and effectiveness, as well as the views of independent civil society and victims and survivors of violations.
♦ The Universal Periodic Review must maintain its strengths of universality and stakeholder engagement, while being recognised as just one tool in the Council’s toolbox which cannot be used as a substitute for other Council mandates or mechanisms.
♦ The Human Rights Council’s Advisory Committee and the Complaints Procedures could be reviewed for their relevance and effectiveness.
The UN human rights treaty bodies, composed of independent human rights experts serving in a non-remunerated and independent capacity, monitor and provide legal interpretation to States on the implementation of their obligations under the core human rights treaties. The work of treaty bodies contributes to prevent violations, promote accountability, and support effective and efficient implementation.
♦ UN human rights treaty bodies should be provided with the resources necessary to fully discharge their mandates. The lack of resources currently provided means that the expertise of members is not fully or efficiently leveraged.
♦ Additional resources are also necessary to ensure that the treaty bodies can operate and review States on a predictable calendar, which would substantially enhance efficiencies for both States and civil society. Treaty bodies should also be provided with additional resources to address a large and inefficient backlog in the determination of individual communications.
♦ Where it is safe and efficient to do so, treaty bodies should consider conducting clusters of State party reviews in the regions, thereby contributing to accessibility and efficiency for States in the region, as well as national and regional-level civil society.
♦ Treaty bodies should ensure, and be provided with the resources to maintain, modalities for online participation. This is necessary to ensure accessibility as well as to avoid the significant financial and environmental costs associated with unnecessary travel.
The promotion, protection and implementation of human rights, as well as investigations into and the prevention of violations, is essential to the efficient and effective promotion and maintenance of peace and security.
♦ The Human Rights Council should be mandated to seize the UN Security Council of human rights matters that may impact on international peace and security, thereby contributing to greater prevention, as well as enhanced coordination and efficiency between mechanisms.
♦ For the same reasons, the Secretary-General should use their mandate under article 99 of the UN Charter to refer to the Security Council any widespread and systematic human rights violations, or early warning signs thereof, that may impact on international peace and security.
♦ All States should oppose and refrain from the use of the veto in the Security Council in situations involving atrocity crimes. This is essential to enable the Security Council to act in such situations and to minimise the enormous human and financial costs associated with such crimes.
Safe and effective civil society access and participation, that is meaningful and inclusive, is essential to ensure that the UN human rights system is relevant and responsive to the situation on the ground. Civil society inputs assist to ensure that the outputs and recommendations of the UN human rights system are community informed and can be implemented effectively and efficiently at the local, national and regional levels.
♦ Civil society space at the UN must be expanded and protected by integrating all previous recommendations on access and participation, in particular:
◊ Ensure hybrid modalities for participation and move away from outdated platforms (e.g., Webex). At a minimum, the General Assembly should create a mandate for hybrid modalities for the Human Rights Council and mechanisms, as well as the Treaty Bodies, that allows UNOG and OHCHR to provide all stakeholders with the necessary channels to participate in meetings via relevant platforms in a permanent and timely manner. The UN should also adopt a system-wide approach by ensuring that hybrid modalities for participation are integral to its work, including in other multilateral fora, such as environmental processes, as well as the Commission on the Status of Women and the NGO Committee, among others.
◊ Similarly, the UN leadership and member states should work to expand physical access for accredited NGOs at all UN premises, and the ban on civil society during the UN General Assembly’s high-level segment should be ended. Similar modalities for civil society participation at the UN in Geneva should apply to civil society participation at the UN in New York and other UN fora, including access to informal negotiations.
◊ Given the crucial role that human rights defenders and victims of human rights violations play in the work of the UN human rights system, efforts must be made to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the mandate to prevent and address intimidation and reprisals against those engaging with the UN human rights system. The OHCHR Senior Official on reprisals should be provided with the resources to maintain a regularly updated, publicly accessible database of reprisals cases brought to the attention of the mandate. This database would bring greater visibility to cases and enable efficient and effective follow-up by NGOs and States. The database should include State responses and follow-up action by UN bodies. The Senior official should also carry out effective and consistent follow-up on all documented cases until they are resolved. This is more efficient and effective than relying on victims to proactively follow up on the status of their cases.
◊ The UN must be reformed to ensure that independent civil society including NGOs can participate in all UN bodies, mechanisms and processes safely, meaningfully and effectively. Among others, the ECOSOC NGO Committee should be reformed to ensure that accreditation processes become more fair, transparent, non-politicised, non-discriminatory and efficient. It must also end the practice of unduly stalling processes, sometimes indefinitely. Current processes, which involve the frequent and repeated deferral and delay of NGO applicants for accreditation, are highly inefficient as well as being incompatible with human rights standards regarding freedom of association and freedom from discrimination. The NGO Committee should also institute hybrid Q&A sessions for applicant NGOs to engage remotely and address the severe backlog of NGOs awaiting accreditation.
In March 2025 the UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative that also coincided with the organisation’s 80th anniversary.
The primary aim of the Initiative stated by the Secretary-General is to be ‘more efficient, to simplify procedures, eliminate overlaps and enhance transparency and accountability.’ The UN80 reform initiative has been also linked to the Pact of the Future adopted in September 2024 and the UN 2.0 that requires for the UN to meet the current needs and requirements of multilateralism and ‘exactly about updating the UN for the 21st century.’
However, the initiative is also linked to the United Nations’ ongoing liquidity crisis, driven by Member States’ continued failure to meet their financial obligations in full and on time over the past seven years.
‘The liquidity crisis we now face is not new. But, today’s financial and political situation adds even greater urgency to our efforts. We face real threats to the very fabric, values, principles and sustainability of multilateralism.’ – stated António Guterres.
The Secretary General appointed Guy Ryder, the Under-Secretary-General for Policy, to lead an internal task force responsible for developing concrete proposals in three areas:
On 12 May 2025 the Secretary General briefed the Member States laying out the system wide reforms reiterating the work towards the three work streams that are the basis of the UN80 reform:
To advance the three UN80 workstreams, seven clusters were established under the UN80 Task Force, in coordination with the Secretariat Working Group. Each cluster brings together organisations with related mandates to drive efficiencies, review mandate implementation, and explore structural reforms.
After the launch of the UN80 Reform Initiative, a policy memo labeled ‘Strictly Confidential’ was circulated among UN agencies but became widely disseminated due to an online leak.
The policy memo is divided into different sections that identify general challenges and propose systemic solutions. These solutions are further broken down into thematic categories: Peace and Security, Humanitarian Affairs, Sustainable Development, Human Rights, the Resident Coordinator System, and also elaborate on cross-cutting proposals.
The memo identifies following systemic challenges:
While aiming to achieve efficiency, effectiveness, and financial sustainability, the memo proposes focusing on three key principles: integration, consolidation, and coordination. These include aligning mandates, reducing duplication, and strengthening coordination.
In case of the human rights pillar the memo proposes to merge multiple entities into a single human rights entity.
The strategic review of structural changes and the identification of inefficiencies will also lead to a reduction in human capacity. Under the UN80 Reform, a 20% budget cut is expected by eliminating duplicates.
On 1st August 2025, the Secretary General published a report on workstream 2 that examines how its mandates are created, delivered and reviewed, and offering proposals for the consideration of Member States. On 27 August 2025, the UN General Assembly set up an ad hoc informal working group on the UN80 Initiative. The group co-chaired by Jamaica and New Zealand will work between 19 September 2025 and March 2026 to consider the proposals contained in the report of the Secretary-General and to identify principles and follow-up actions to improve the creation, delivery and review of mandates. A resolution on mandate creation, implementation and review is expected to be adopted by the General Assembly on 31 March 2026.
On 18 September 2025, the Secretary General published a report on workstream 3 that sets out proposals to strengthen the UN’s delivery across all three pillars of its work – peace and security, sustainable development and human rights – while also advancing more effective collaboration across the pillars. The only substantive proposal for the human rights pillar is the establishment of ‘a Human Rights Group comprising entities from across the UN system, led by the High Commissioner for Human Rights’. The Group will ‘ensure that human rights considerations are systematically integrated into UN policies and activities, while also improving efficiency and impact across the system at all levels’.
Regarding Workstream 1, on 16 September 2025, the Secretary General released the Revised estimates’ report that called for eliminating 105 posts at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as part of a 15% reduction in its overall budget, compared to the original budget for 2026 released earlier in 2025. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) – an advisory body to the General Assembly Fifth Committee, the UN main budgetary body– report, circulated in early December, endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposed cuts, and recommended a further 11% in post reductions at OHCHR, bringing the total cut to OHCHR posts to some 16.7% (117 posts). On 30 December 2025, States largely endorsed the recommendations of the ACABQ and approved the UN 2026 budget, agreeing on cutting 117 jobs at the UN’s Human Rights Office. The final budget endorses proposed cuts under the first stage of the UN80 Initiative process (‘Workstream 1’). This disproportionately targets human rights, imperilling the UN’s ability to investigate grave abuses, and advance human rights globally. The budget is likely to be further reviewed in 2026 to reflect future proposals emerging from discussions under workstream 2 and workstream 3.
Key dates:
The human rights pillar remains chronically underfunded and is consistently among the budgets that suffer the most significant cuts by the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on the basis of recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
of the UN’s total expenditure is spent by the UN human rights pillar.
of its approved regular budget was actually received by OHCHR in 2025, as a result of Sates not paying their dues in full and on time.
posts are being cut at the UN’s Human Rights Office in 2026. This imperils the UN’s ability to investigate grave abuses, and advance human rights globally.
On 16 September 2025, the UN Secretary-General published his report revising his earlier proposal for the UN’s 2026 budget (known as ‘Revised estimates’ report). Budget cuts proposed disproportionately targeted the human rights pillar, with 15% proposed cuts, compared with 11.7% for the development pillar. This run contrary to the Secretary-General’s reiterated commitment to ‘ensure balance across pillars’, a concern shared by many countries. Human rights bodies affected by reductions other than OHCHR included investigative mechanisms on Myanmar (15%) and Syria (16%), the UN’s mechanism for missing persons in Syria (15-17%), and UN Women (15%).
Variation of UN80 budget proposed reductions per pillar/area of work
|
Human rights (Part VI, Section 24) |
258,224.00
|
262,955.40
|
223,563.70
|
39,391.70
|
-15.0% |
8.3% |
|
Development (Parts IV, V and XIII) |
697,718.30
|
697,441.80
|
615,536.70
|
81,905.10
|
-11.7% |
17.2% |
|
Peace and security (Part II) |
915,068.70
|
864,670.30
|
741,737.60
|
122,932.70
|
-14.2% |
25.8% |
|
Humanitarian assistance (Part VI, Sections 25-27) |
155,060.80
|
157,233.70
|
154,113.00
|
3,120.70
|
-2.0% |
0.7% |
|
International justice and law (Part III)* |
104,744.10
|
106,464.20
|
95,079.90
|
11,393.30
|
-10.7% |
2.4% |
In its report circulated at the beginning of December, the ACABQ broadly endorsed the cuts proposed by the Secretary-General. It accepted the creation of two additional posts but proposed cutting 14 others across regional offices, increasing the total of post reductions from 105 to 117. This brought the total of recommended post abolitions to 18.3% of OHCHR’s current 2025 posts, and to 16.7% of the initial 2026 budget proposal, which reflects the actual resources OHCHR needs to deliver on new mandates created by Member States.
Variation in OHCHR posts under UN80 budget reductions proposals
|
Number of posts |
641 |
702 |
597 |
585 (-12 posts) |
|
Variation compared to initial budget proposal |
|
|
15% (-105 posts) |
16.7% (-117 posts) |
On 30 December 2025, States at the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (5C) – the UN’s main budgetary body – approved a budget for 2026, agreeing on significant budget cuts under the first stage of the UN80 Initiative process (‘Workstream 1’).
The resolution approving the UN’s 2026 budget largely endorses the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) – an advisory body to the Fifth Committee – which had endorsed and expanded upon a proposal made by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in September to reflect efficiencies sought under UN80 reform.
While the ACABQ endorsed the proposed redeployment of 71 posts to OHCHR regional offices as part of the Office’s ‘regionalisation’ strategy to boost its presence on the ground, its cuts target posts proposed for establishment in the regional offices of Vienna, Beirut, Panama, Bangkok, Pretoria and Addis Ababa. In the end, 117 jobs were cut at the UN’s Human Rights Office.
A separate budget resolution adopted by the Fifth Committee endorsed the ACABQ’s recommendations concerning the Secretary-General’s request for additional resources arising from HRC resolutions adopted in 2025 that were not anticipated in the original proposed budget (known as the HRC Revised Estimates). The ACABQ recommended a drastic reduction of 20% to the Secretary-General’s proposed additional appropriation of USD 14.6 million, approving only 13 of the 25 new posts requested. Of those approved posts, ten are dedicated to the establishment of an independent mechanism to investigate atrocities committed in Afghanistan, mandated by a historic consensus resolution adopted by States at the HRC last September.
While accounting for less than 10% of UN80 cost-saving efforts, the budget cuts approved will gravely jeopardise the UN’s ability to promote and protect human rights, given its historic underfunding and related understaffing.
Human rights work is human resources-intensive, yet proposed cuts mostly take the form of post abolitions. Cutting these posts will severely hamper the UN’s ability to assist States in revising laws and policies, improving governance, training officials and participating in global debates, as well as its ability to monitor, document and act on early warning signs to prevent rights violations, and to investigate and promote accountability.
Even at equal percentage of cuts, the human rights pillar would be disproportionately impacted given it is chronically underfunded and it is already stretched in its core capacity (OHCHR mandate) and its capacity to deliver HRC mandates. OHCHR has limited capacity to absorb cuts given the nature and structure of its work. Year after year, human rights bodies have been asked to do more without a proportionate increase in budget, and with a recent decrease in voluntary donations by States. Forcing OHCHR to work ‘within existing resources’ has greatly reduced OHCHR’s capacity to deliver on mandates across all areas of human rights work.
Nearly all the cuts in the 2026 budget are to posts that were vacant as a result of a hiring freeze prompted by the UN’s cash crisis, further eroding chances for these important human rights mandates to be implemented. Most vacancies relate to Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions adopted in recent years, tabled by countries from all regions, covering diverse areas of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights.
These include priorities for Global South countries in the areas of economic, social and cultural rights, sustainable development, racial discrimination, and climate change, among others. They also include innovative areas of human rights work requiring dedicated external expertise, such as new and emerging technologies, AI or biodiversity.
More than any other pillar of the UN, the human rights system draws on and leverages the very substantial pro bono expertise and experience of hundreds of independent human rights experts. Cuts to the human rights pillar will substantially reduce the UN’s capacity to access and leverage this substantial in-kind contribution. While inquiries on atrocities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Palestine remain not fully operational, cuts to country visits by Special Rapporteurs and reduced sessions for human rights treaty committees have already reduced opportunities to engage with civil society and governments to revise laws and policies, and protect at-risk individuals.
Finally, as a recent States’ joint statement stresses the impact of budget cuts for Global South countries, as a reduced OHCHR presence on the ground means fewer opportunities to document local realities and engage meaningfully. The indefinite postponement of HRC-mandated mechanisms also affects key priorities for civil society and countries in the Global South, in areas as diverse as child digital safety, cyberbullying, domestic violence, adolescent pregnancies, law enforcement and peaceful protest, HIV response, the rights to work and social security in the informal sector, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and education as a tool to combat racism.
‘Against the entrenched belief that human rights only benefit the ‘West’, these budget cuts will greatly weaken the UN’s ability to provide vital assistance to developing countries in training national authorities, building human rights-respectful economies and development policies, combatting racial discrimination and tackling the human rights impacts of climate change’ (Raphaël Viana David, ISHR)
Cuts to the UN human rights regular budget mean that the system will become more reliant on voluntary donations, which have the potential to skew the work of the system. The best way to ensure that the human rights system is universal and can operate in the most principled, non-selective and non-discriminatory manner is to ensure that it receives adequate regular budgetary contributions and is not unduly reliant on the largesse of certain States.
In recent years, a liquidity crisis fuelled by the late or non-payments of dues by the US and China had already prompted High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to suspend the delivery of reports, workshops and other activities mandated by the Human Rights Council (HRC). The HRC has also reduced the length of its sessions, limiting space for States, experts and civil society to address some of the world’s most pressing rights issues and crises.
In 2024, OHCHR only received 87% of its approved regular budget. The lack of funds led the HRC to adopt resolution 55/115 on postponing 17 mandated activities. This included cancelling a written update on the human rights situation in Myanmar and cancelling or postponing to later sessions or to the following year other activities such as updates, seminars, workshops, high-level panels, reports and guidelines. The Office was also limited to hiring temporary staff only.
The disbursement of funds to OHCHR worsened in 2025, and as of June, the Office had received only 73% of its approved regular budget for the year. According to the Office, it has been allocated 85% of its required resources for core staff salaries, 73% for temporary personnel supporting mandated activities, and 45% for operation costs and activities. A letter from High Commissioner Türk highlighted the impact of cuts the Office has been forced to adopt. This included 13 HRC-mandated activities that cannot be completed in 2025 or 2026, including several reports, workshops, or panel discussions around the rights of women and girls, or a global consultation on peaceful protests. A commission of inquiry on serious human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the most recent country investigation established by the HRC (at the time of drafting), cannot operate due to the lack of liquidity.
According to an update of the UN Secretariat to the 5th Committee of the General Assembly on 9 October 2025, as of 30 September 2025, the UN would require about $3,530 million to execute the 2025 budget in full. As of 30 December, only 151 of the 193 UN Member States had paid their dues for 2025. On 1 December 2025, Secretary-General Guterres reminded the Fifth Committee that non-paying States had accumulated an ‘unacceptable volume of arrears’ totalling some USD 1.586 billion, 95% of which were owed by the United States. Taking into account the late payments by Russia and Argentina in early December, Mexico and Venezuela closed out the year with the largest amounts of unpaid contributions by year-end after the US, although in amounts that represent a small fraction of US arrears.
The liquidity crisis is exacerbated by the return of unspent cash (from late payments of contributions) to all Member States (proportionately to their scales of assessment) in the form of credits to their assessments two years later (eg. the UN will return USD 300 million in credits in 2026 from unspent liquidities in 2024, most probably relating to China’s payment on 27 December). While this rule exists to ensure that cash unspent due to efficiencies is returned, the reality is that cash is unspent because States are paying their dues too late to be spent, leaving the already cash-strapped organisation with an even smaller budget.
In a somewhat positive development, in December 2025, States agreed to suspend the return of unspent funds in the form of credits to Member States’ future payments, but only for those Member States in arrears on their payments. Returned funds will now be deducted from those States’ arrears, instead of as a credit to future payments. Unfortunately, States failed to agree to suspending the return of unspent funds in times of liquidity crisis when such return would impair the UN’s ability to implement its approved budget, as repeatedly called for by the UN Secretariat. This would have prevented the UN from returning USD 300 million in 2026 (nearly 10% of its 2026 regular budget), largely resulting from China’s late payment on 27 December 2024. The suspension of credit return to those in arrears will only result in reducing credits by 25%, per UN Secretariat estimates.
The impact of regular budget reductions is compounded with the reduction of voluntary donations (in particular un-earmarked), as OHCHR relies approximately at 60% to voluntary contributions.
Visit our landing page on how the liquidity crisis and budget cuts related to the UN80 Initiative are affecting the work of UN human rights mechanisms since 2024 to learn more.
Reducing human rights budgets does not contribute substantially to cost-saving efforts. For instance, cuts to the OHCHR budget accounts for 10% of the total UN80 budget reduction.
However, budget reductions to the human rights pillar have severe ramifications for human rights protection on the ground, investigation, accountability and technical assistance to revise laws and improve policies.
ISHR has calculated what OHCHR could do with 1% budget increase or what it could lose for each 1% budget reduced.
Based on the budget approved for OHCHR in 2025, 1% of OHCHR budget equals to 2.582 million USD. This corresponds approximately to*:
A 15% cut therefore corresponds to losing 15 times these activities!
ISHR urges all States to:
‘The UN human rights system—especially the Independent Expert on SOGI—is one of the few sources of legitimacy and visibility we have. It is a moral and political shield. Its renewal is not symbolic; it is essential. Without it, our lives and struggles risk being even more invisible and abandoned.
But the UN human rights system as a whole must do better.
First, it must become more accessible. Communities on the ground often don’t know how to engage or see any concrete results from engagement. Bureaucracy should not stand between a victim of hate crime and a system meant to protect them.
Second, it must protect us. Many defenders, especially trans and lesbian activists, are burnt out, under attack, and without recourse. The UN must put in place real-time mechanisms to respond to attacks on human rights defenders.
Third, it must center intersectionality—not just as a buzzword, but as a practice. The realities of being LGBTI and poor, rural, Roma, refugee, or a survivor of violence must be front and center.
We don’t want pity. We want rights. We want to live freely and safely, with dignity, like anyone else. The UN must rise to the challenge—not only to protect the LGBTI community, but to uphold the credibility of the entire human rights system.‘
‘The UN might be a multilateral arrangement for States, but ultimately it needs to be responsive and accountable to “we, the peoples”, as stated in the UN Charter.
We organise ourselves as civil society – paid or unpaid, formal or informal – and are key stakeholders in the design, development and implementation of all UN outcomes, especially those of the human rights bodies and mechanisms. It is time to take us more seriously, and to formalise our role and existence.
Back home, when I told the women human rights defenders in my network that I am coming here to Geneva, they all told me ‘don’t bother, you can’t do anything there’. They say this is an institution created by the wealthy and powerful States to serve only themselves. Will this be the legacy of the UN at 80, or can we address this perception meaningfully?’
‘We cannot afford to speak of human rights in purely technical terms. We cannot treat structural inequality as a background issue. If the UN is to live up to its principles, it must take a more honest and active stance toward this systemic injustice.
So what can the UN do to remain relevant and responsive — not just in Colombia, but across similar contexts — to better address these structural and historical systems?
The UN must look inward and acknowledge its own colonial legacies — in who speaks, who decides, and whose knowledge counts. It must shift power toward grassroots and frontline communities, especially those that have been historically silenced.
It must treat systematic matters as core drivers of violence and exclusion, and not simply as issues to be managed through side panels or technical cooperation.’
‘From our work with the communities, we feel a lost of hope regarding the human rights agenda… A cultural shift is needed from the UN and this needs to reach the “unconvinced” and strengthen the social movements advancing human and environmental rights from the bottom-up.’
ISHR ran an online survey for human rights defenders and organisations working in national and regional contexts between 3 June and 16 July. We received 171 responses. Read an analysis of defenders' views on the future and the reforms of the UN.
Read the findings
In a world dominated by great powers, the UN human rights system still has one last lifeline: strength in numbers, writes Raphaël Viana David, human rights advocate at the International Service for Human Rights. Op-Ed published in Geneva Solutions on 16 March 2026.
New landing page! This is a compilation of publicly available information on how the liquidity crisis and budget cuts related to the UN80 Initiative are affecting the work of UN human rights mechanisms since 2024, including their ability to fulfil their mandates and deliver tangible improvements for individuals and communities.
A cross-regional coalition of 90 States have issued a joint declaration at the UN Human Rights Council emphasising the critical need to defend multilateralism amidst escalating global conflicts and eroding respect for international law and human rights.
Joint submission by 18 NGOs made in the context of the UN80 Workstream 2 mandate implementation review zero draft resolution. The submission was shared with UN Member States ahead of the 13 February deadline for written feedback on the zero draft, in the hopes that the views of civil society engaging with the UN human rights system might inform States own written feedback.
At a time of financial strife and ongoing reform for the organisation, States have adopted a 2026 budget cutting 117 jobs at the UN’s Human Rights Office. The final budget endorses proposed cuts that disproportionately target human rights, imperilling the UN’s ability to investigate grave abuses, and advance human rights globally.
40 countries, led by Chile, warned that proposed budget cuts under the UN80 initiative would severely weaken an already underfunded UN human rights pillar. As negotiations kick off in New York, ISHR urges States to prevent disproportionate cuts to human rights and ensure the international human rights system remains credible, effective and responsive.
ISHR sent a written submission to the ad hoc informal working group on the review of mandates under workstream 2 of the UN80 Initiative ahead of their mid-term report due on 15 December.
Ahead of the Chief Executive Board meeting of 30 and 31 October, ISHR sent a letter setting out some key principles and proposals to strengthen the UN human rights pillar under Workstream 3 in the context of the UN80 Initiative.
In light of the UN’s liquidity crisis since 2024, ISHR compares when UN Member States are paying their assessed contributions to the UN’s regular budget over the period 2019-2025.
New ISHR report exposes how some States are manoeuvring to defund the UN's human rights work. The report documents coordinated efforts to block or cut funding for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Human Rights Council investigations, as well as inconsistent payments that have deepened the UN’s financial crisis.
ISHR analysis of revised 2026 budget proposal for UN80 reform points to disproportionate cuts to chronically-underfunded human rights pillar. Governments from all regions should reverse cuts and ensure the UN human rights system - crucial to international peace, security and development - is adequately funded.
For years, China and the United States have been quietly reaping the benefits of their status at the United Nations. The rest of the world needs a strong, responsive UN, and it must get everyone to fork up the cash, says Phil Lynch, Executive Director of the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR). Op-Ed published by SwissInfo.ch on 29 October 2025.
Letter on the UN80 Initiative sent on 21 July 2025 by 17 civil society organisations to the UN Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights
As international human rights law and institutions face unprecedented erosion, over 70 States from across all world regions came together in March 2025 to re-commit to human rights, the international rule of law, and multilateral cooperation. ISHR was pleased to work with a range of States and other partners in developing and promoting this joint statement.
An ISHR opinion piece on the multilateralism that we urgently need.
Do you find it difficult to understand what the UN80 Initiative is all about? ISHR has produced a document in which we have attempted to systematise useful information that could support civil society's advocacy and engagement UN80 Initiative process.
Read more
Do you promote human rights at the national or regional level? Are you interested in understanding more what the UN80 Initiative is about and whether it will make any difference to your engagement with UN human rights mechanisms? Then join us on 24 or 26 March for an online webinar on the UN80 reform process and how it may affect NGOs and human rights defenders working at the national and regional levels.
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